We examine the distribution of incentives across executives with explicit divisional responsibilities, those with broad oversight authority over the firm, and CEOs. Oversight executives have pay-performance incentives that are $1.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than those of divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are $5.65 per tho usand higher than for executives with divisional responsibility. The aggregate pay-firm performance sensitivity of the top management team is substantial, at $32.32 per thousand for the median firm. CEO incentives are 42 to 58 percent of the aggregate incentives to the top management team. We match a subset of our divisional executives to the divisions they manage.
Introduction
Much of the academic literature and popular discussion of executive compensation focuses on the incentives provided to chief executive o¢cers (CEOs). However, public corporations are run by teams of top managers, and each of these managers has di¤erent responsibilities. For example, chief operating o¢cers have broad oversight authority for the …rm as a whole. In contrast, heads of large divisions have more narrowly de…ned authority but bear direct responsibility for a subset of the …rm's activities. The focus on CEOs ignores important issues in the internal organization of the …rm.
As top managers have di¤erent levels and areas of authority, they will have di¤erent measures of performance that can be used to provide incentives. The sensitivity of compensation to …rm performance will depend on how precisely performance is measured for all areas for which the manager is responsible. In particular, managers with precise signals of e¤ort other than …rm performance will receive less exposure to overall …rm performance in their compensation. Using a panel dataset of 33,607 executive-year observations, we …nd evidence that managers with explicit divisional responsibilities have lower pay-performance sensitivities than managers with broad oversight authority, who in turn have lower pay-performance sensitivities than do CEOs.
The …nding that incentives di¤er across job classi…cations is important for two reasons. First, a central issue for understanding the internal organization of the …rm is the alignment of incentives and responsibilities among the top management team. Recent work by Haubrich (1994) , Garen (1994) , Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , and Jin (2002) demonstrates that the principalagent model explains di¤erences in incentives across …rms. However, an analysis based solely on inter…rm comparisons cannot determine whether incentives are a¤ected by di¤erences in managerial responsibility. We show that pay-performance incentives di¤er across executives according to their responsibilities and are structured to motivate managers, sub ject to the precision with which shareholders can measure each manager's e¤ort.
Second, much of the existing literature on the magnitude of incentives provided by compensation contracts focuses on chief executive o¢cers (e.g., Lambert and Larcker (1987) , Jensen and Murphy (1990) , and Hall and Liebman (1998) ). However, there are other members of the top management team who may also have signi…cant incentives. We show that incentives provided to the CEO are 42 to 58 percent of the aggregate incentives to the top management team (de…ned as the top …ve executives) in our data. The median pay-performance sensitivity of the top management team is $32:32 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth.
We test predictions from the principal-agent models of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Banker and Datar (1989) . In these models, the primary means for shareholders to ensure that managers take optimal actions is to tie managers' compensation to the performance of their …rms; that is, to provide high-powered incentives for managers to maximize the returns to shareholders.
Suppose that shareholders observe two potentially correlated signals about the manager's e¤ort.
The …rst signal is the performance of the …rm as a whole. The second signal is an individualspeci…c measure of performance. For example, the second signal for a manager with divisional responsibility could be a measure of divisional performance based on accounting data. The structure of incentives will depend upon the relative precision of the two signals, with more weight placed on the more precise signal.
Because the CEO is at the top of the corporate hierarchy, the CEO will have responsibility for all areas of corporate performance. The most informative signal for CEOs is …rm performance, measured by total returns to shareholders. Firm performance is also quite informative for managers with oversight authority for the entire …rm. Managers with oversight authority may also have an individual signal such as a subjective report by the CEO on their performance. In contrast, managers with divisional responsibility have a relatively more precise signal than overall …rm performance. Their compensation should depend more heavily on divisional performance.
The pay-…rm performance sensitivity will be higher for CEOs than for managers with oversight authority, who will in turn have a higher sensitivity than will managers with divisional responsibility. Similarly, the pay-divisional performance sensitivity will be higher for managers with divisional responsibility than it will be for CEOs or managers with oversight authority. Our focus on managerial responsibilities allows us to provide a new test of the principal-agent model of executive compensation.
We use data on executive compensation from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp dataset.
Our sample consists of data for the top …ve executives (ranked annually by salary and bonus) from the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 companies from 1993 to 1997. There are 13,109 di¤erent executives and 33,607 executive-year observations. The sample is designed to be representative of the corporate sector and is large enough to allow us to make precise comparisons of the pay-performance sensitivities of managers based on their responsibilities within the …rm.
We start by testing predictions relating to the sensitivity of compensation to …rm performance.
Next, for a subsample of our …rms and executives, we can match divisional level executives from ExecuComp to the areas of the …rm for which they bear direct responsibility in Compustat's Industry Segment …le. For these observations, we are able to provide a direct test of how strongly pay is linked to divisional performance as well as how this link varies with the precision of the performance measures.
We classify managers into four mutually exclusive groups: CEOs, executives other than CEOs with oversight authority for the entire …rm, executives with divisional responsibility, and executives with neither oversight authority nor divisional responsibility. In practice, optimal incentive contracts will structure executive compensation so that it is correlated with the total return to shareholders, typically through ownership of shares of the …rm's stock or grants of options on the …rm's stock. This correlation is the pay-…rm performance sensitivity. Executives with oversight authority who are not the CEO have signi…cantly higher pay-…rm performance sensitivities than do executives with divisional responsibility. The median pay-…rm performance sensitivity from stock and options for executives with oversight authority is $3:26 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth, 67 percent higher than the median pay-…rm performance sensitivity of $1:71 per thousand for executives with divisional responsibility. Both sets of executives have signi…-cantly lower pay-…rm performance sensitivities than the median value of $13:08 per thousand for CEOs. Top executives classi…ed as having neither oversight authority nor divisional responsibility have a median pay-…rm performance sensitivity of $1:99 per thousand.
For the subsample of divisional executives whom we can match with the segments that they manage, we estimate a positive pay-divisional performance sensitivity between annual salary and bonus and the growth in divisional sales. We estimate that a one percent increase in divisional sales increases short-term compensation by 0:28 percent. This point estimate is higher than the estimated pay-divisional performance sensitivities for CEOs and executives with broad oversight responsibilities at the same …rms. We show that the pay-divisional performance sensitivity is decreasing in the volatility of the divisional performance measure for divisional executives matched to their divisions. We further show that the pay-…rm performance sensitivities for these executives are lower when the divisional performance measures are less volatile. These …ndings suggest that …rms optimally rely less on incentives based on the performance of the …rm as a whole when more precise signals of managerial e¤ort are available. Overall, our …ndings are consistent with a principal-agent model in which there are multiple di¤erentially informative signals about managers' provision of e¤ort.
Our results showing di¤erences in incentives by managerial responsibility are not driven by di¤erences in executive-speci…c characteristics, such as ability or experience, or di¤erences in the level of compensation by job classi…cation. Executive …xed e¤ects absorb much of the variation in incentives across job classi…cations, because characteristics such as average ability and experience di¤er across job classi…cations. Our primary results focus on the di¤erences between executives with oversight authority and those with divisional responsibility. Controlling for executive …xed e¤ects, the level of compensation, and variables related to the …rm's contracting environment, executives with oversight authority have pay-…rm performance incentives that are $1:22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than the pay-…rm performance incentives of executives with divisional responsibility. For completeness, we also present results for CEOs.
We …nd that the pay-…rm performance incentives of CEOs are $5:65 per thousand higher than the pay-performance incentives of executives with divisional responsibility. These di¤erences in pay-…rm performance incentives across groups re ‡ect the properties of the job, and not the characteristics of the person in the job. They are identi…ed econometrically by changes in incentives that are observed when executives actually switch groups. These di¤erences are not the result of cross-sectional variation in executive characteristics.
Our work is related to several other papers that link compensation contracts to managerial responsibility. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) note that managers will have di¤erent measures of performance that can be used to provide incentives in the context of subjective performance evaluation. Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) examine bonuses and long-term compensation for group CEOs, divisional CEOs, and plant managers. Using survey data encompassing a cross-section of 472 observations from 246 …rms, they …nd that incentives depend on perfor-mance both at the manager's level (e.g., divisional performance) and performance above her level (e.g., corporate performance). They show that the relative weight placed on performance above the manager's level depends on factors such as product and geographic diversi…cation. Keating (1997) surveys 78 …rms in a single year and asks how important …rm accounting performance, …rm stock price performance, and division accounting performance are in evaluating division managers.
He …nds that …rm-wide performance measures matter more in divisional manager evaluations for relatively larger divisions and for divisions with greater …rm-wide impact. Murphy and Oyer (2001) examine the role of discretionary bonuses based on subjective assessments of managerial performance. Using a survey of 280 bonus plans gathered by a large compensation-consulting …rm, they …nd that discretion is less important in determining CEO pay than the pay of other executives and that more diversi…ed …rms are relatively less likely to compensate their business unit managers based on …rm-wide performance. Relative to these other studies, the advantage of our approach is the ability to study compensation at a much broader panel of …rms and executives. Barron and Waddell (2002) also use the ExecuComp panel to study di¤erences in incentives for executives. They rank executives by compensation and …nd that higher-paid executives receive more equity-based incentives. They argue that this is because it is more costly to the …rm for a higher ranking executive to make mistakes in project evaluation. Their explanation is complementary to ours. By controlling for the level of compensation, we control for the possibility that executive rank based on compensation is driving our …ndings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the compensation data and discuss the managerial job classi…cations that we use. The econometric results comparing incentives across groups of executives are presented in Section 3. The main empirical result is that executives with speci…c divisional responsibility have lower pay-…rm performance sensitivities than executives who have oversight authority for the entire …rm. In Section 4, we describe the matching of divisional executives to industry segments and present our empirical results on pay-divisional performance sensitivities. Section 5 concludes.
Data
Our main source of data is Standard and Poor's ExecuComp dataset, a supplement to the Compustat database. We use ExecuComp to construct our measures of executive compensation and …rm performance. ExecuComp contains data on all aspects of compensation for the top …ve executives (ranked annually by salary and bonus) at each of the …rms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600. Due to enhanced federal reporting requirements for …scal years ending after December 15, 1992, the ExecuComp data for years beginning in 1993 are virtually complete. Our sample extends from 1993 to 1997. It consists of 33; 607 executive-year observations for 13; 109 executives. 1 The ExecuComp data are collected directly from the companies' proxy statements and related …lings with the Securities Exchange Commission. We also determine the executives' managerial responsibilities based on their job title reported in ExecuComp. We calculate the variance of monthly stock returns using data from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP).
Classifying Executives Based on Responsibilities
We argue that managerial responsibilities provide a good indicator for performance measures and hence incentives for executives. As an example, consider the case of Discovery Communications.
Discovery introduced a bonus program in which the president and two other top o¢cers receive bonuses based entirely on overall company performance. By contrast, the four division presidents receive bonuses based 40 percent on overall company performance, 40 percent on division performance, and 20 percent on individual performance. Corporate vice-presidents without divisional responsibility receive bonuses based 40 percent on overall company performance and 60 percent on individual performance. Divisional employees receive bonuses based 10 percent on overall corporate performance, 10 percent on divisional performance, and 80 percent on individual performance (Glater (2001) ). The point of this bonus scheme is to link pay to performance in those areas for which the manager is responsible. As a result, for executives such as divisional presidents, there 1 Our analysis in this paper uses the October 1998 release of the data. The complete dataset includes 49; 764 executive-year observations between 1993 and 1997. We exclude 4; 932 observations because their …rms' data on monthly stock returns is either missing from CRSP or includes fewer than 12 months of returns needed to calculate the variance. Of the remaining observations, 9; 030 do not have reported job titles, 1; 800 do not have all the information necessary to compute incentives from stock and options, and 395 do not have compensation data. See Standard and Poor's (1995) for documentation of the ExecuComp dataset.
are multiple performance measures available and these performance measures all enter the compensation contract. Ultimately, we will show that, in our sample, the extent to which each of these performance measures is used is in ‡uenced by how informative the performance measure is.
In order to do so, we classify executives into four groups based on their reported job titles, as shown in Table 1 . The classi…cation scheme is designed to correspond to the relative weight that would be put on …rm performance in an optimal compensation contract given the availability of other potentially informative signals of the executives' e¤orts. The job title reported for each executive in ExecuComp is up to thirty characters in length and corresponds most closely to the title reported by the …rm in the summary compensation table of its DEF 14A …ling to the SEC.
The …rst group is chief executive o¢cers. CEOs clearly have responsibility for all aspects of …rm performance, and the most logical measure of their e¤orts, broadly de…ned, is the total returns to their shareholders. There are unlikely to be other precise signals that contain incremental information about a CEO's e¤ort, relative to the signals available for other top executives. CEO status is determined by ExecuComp to be the individual who held the title for the longest time during the year. Thus, each …rm has only one CEO in each year in our sample.
For all other executives, total returns to shareholders are clearly correlated with their e¤ort, and this correlation will be re ‡ected in their pay-performance sensitivities. Because of the assignment of responsibilities within the …rm, however, this measure of performance may be relatively less informative than individual-speci…c signals about an executive's e¤ort. As a result, other executives will have lower pay-…rm performance sensitivities than the CEO. These executives can be further distinguished based on whether they have oversight authority for the performance of the …rm as a whole.
Our second group is comprised of the most prominent examples of executives with oversight authority-presidents, chairmen, vice-chairmen, chief …nancial o¢cers (CFOs), and chief operating o¢cers (COOs)-who are not the CEO. This group should have pay-performance incentives that are lower than those of the CEOs and higher than those of other executives. Individual-speci…c signals for executives with oversight authority include a performance evaluation by the CEO as well as indications of performance in any areas of the …rm for which the executive has management responsibilities. Given the division of responsibilities in the …rm, these signals may provide incremental information on the executive's e¤ort beyond the total return to shareholders. Table 1 shows that of the executives in this group, the percentages reporting each occupation are: president (30:28), chairman (11:02), vice-chairman (12:27), COO (27:03), and CFO (42:55). Also included are other chief executives whose reported title includes CEO but who are not identi…ed as the CEO by ExecuComp, comprising 6:08 percent.
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The sum of the percentages exceeds 100 because executives often have titles that include more than one of these occupations.
The most important di¤erence between groups for our purposes is whether the executive is listed as a top executive of a division within the …rm. Our third group is comprised of all executives without oversight authority who meet this criterion. Table 1 receive a fairly precise signal of their e¤orts in the performance of that division. As a result, the sensitivity of their pay to the overall performance of the …rm is lower than it is for executives in the Oversight group.
The fourth and …nal group consists of executives who have neither explicit divisional responsibility nor primary oversight authority. Table 1 shows that 19:61 percent are listed as having production-related responsibilities. Examples of titles for these executives include " Sr. v-pengineering," "Exec. v-p-research & dev," "Exec. v-p-manufacturing," and "Exec. v-p-steel 
Calculating Incentives
Jensen and Murphy (1990) demonstrate that although incentives can be provided to executives through various forms of compensation, the majority of incentives come from holdings of stock and options. Hall and Liebman (1998) show that incentives from stock and particularly stock options have grown substantially since the sample period used by Jensen and Murphy (1990) . As a result, we focus primarily on incentives provided by holdings of stock and options. For completeness, in section 3.3, we present results on incentives from annual ‡ow compensation and discuss the total pay-performance sensitivities of the top management team. In addition, in section 4.2, we consider incentives from salary and bonus.
ExecuComp contains precise data on annual ‡ow compensation, including the details of options granted in the sample year. It also contains precise data on executives' holdings of stock in their own companies and summary information on the value of options granted in years prior to the sample year. For stock, the pay-performance sensitivity is simply the fraction of the …rm that the executive owns. A CEO who holds three percent of the stock outstanding in her …rm has a pay-performance sensitivity from stockholdings of $30 per thousand dollar change in shareholder wealth. In order to calculate incentives provided by options, we multiply the fraction of the …rm's stock on which the options are written by the deltas of the options.
We calculate option deltas as follows. As noted above, there are two types of option holdings in the dataset: those granted in the sample year and those granted in years prior to the sample year. For options granted in the sample year, companies must report the number of securities, the exercise price, and exercise date. This information is su¢cient to apply the Black-Scholes model directly when combined with data on volatility, interest rates, dividend yields, and stock prices. We follow the assumptions in Standard and Poor's (1995) about when options will be exercised. For option grants in sample year 1994 and earlier, we assume they will be exercised 80 percent through their term. For example, if the term of the options is 10 years, we assume that the options are exercised after eight years. For option grants in sample year 1995 and later, we assume the options will be exercised 70 percent through their term. The term structure of interest rates is obtained by interpolating the year-end Treasury yields for the 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 30-year constant maturity series. In applying the Black-Scholes formula, we use the dividend yield for the company reported by ExecuComp and calculate the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for each company using data from CRSP. We use monthly total returns to shareholders over the sixty months preceding the sample year. For example, to compute the standard deviation for a …rm in 1993, we calculate the standard deviation of monthly returns from January, 1988 , to December, 1992 . If a …rm has fewer than sixty but more than twelve months of data, then we use all of the available data. If a …rm has fewer than twelve monthly return observations, then we exclude it from our sample. We multiply this value by p 12 to get the standard deviation of continuously compounded annual returns.
For options granted in years prior to the sample year, the proxy statement does not list each option separately. It reports only the aggregate number of securities and the aggregate "intrinsic value" of the options that are in the money. The intrinsic value is the stock price at the end of the …scal year less the option's exercise price. Following Murphy (1999) , we treat all existing options as a single grant with a …ve-year remaining term and an exercise price such that the intrinsic value is equal to that reported on the proxy statement. Apart from having to impute this exercise price and assuming a …ve-year term remaining to expiration, the method for options granted in previous years is the same as for option grants in the sample year. The …nal three variables are total ‡ow compensation and the long-and short-term components of ‡ow compensation, also expressed in millions of 1997 dollars. Total ‡ow compensation includes salary, bonus, grants of restricted stock, grants of stock options, long-term incentive plan payouts, gross-ups for tax liabilities, perquisites, preferential discounts on stock purchases, contributions to bene…t plans, severance payments, and all other compensation. These results are di¤erent from the existing empirical evidence from Murphy (1985) . While he shows that higher ranking executives receive greater compensation than lower ranking executives, he also …nds that higher ranking executives do not receive greater pay-performance incentives.
The key di¤erence between our paper and his paper is that he focuses on incentives from ‡ow compensation and does not consider existing holdings of stock and stock options.
Figures 1 and 2 along with Table 2 suggest that pay-performance incentives vary quite dramatically by job classi…cation. In general, the observed variation in pay-performance incentives can be attributed to two types of factors: executive-speci…c characteristics and the precision of performance measures associated with jobs as suggested by the theory. In the next section, we establish econometrically how much of the variation in incentives is attributable to the precision of performance measures associated with jobs.
Our main econometric speci…cations require data on the return to shareholders. ExecuComp provides data on the total return to shareholders in each sample year, speci…ed in percent returns.
We subtract the growth in the Consumer Price Index to get real returns. The mean and median percent returns are 18:47 and 12:29, respectively. Dollar returns to shareholders are equal to the percent returns multiplied by the market value of the …rm at the beginning of the sample year, which is also reported in ExecuComp. The median dollar return is $92 million and the mean dollar return is $696 million.
The variance of dollar returns is included in the regressions as a determinant of pay-performance incentives. The variance for each …rm is calculated using the monthly dollar returns from CRSP.
The standard deviations of dollar returns are $612 million at the mean and $228 million at the median in our sample. Other variables included in our speci…cations come from Compustat. We include sales with a sample mean of $3:7 billion and a median of $1:1 billion, dividend yield with a mean of 1:64 percent and a median of 1:15 percent, and the ratio of debt to assets with a mean of 0:23 and a median of 0:22.
Empirical Results
The structure of incentives will di¤er for managers with di¤erentially informative signals about their performance. Banker and Datar (1989) show that, under the optimal contract, managers are compensated more heavily based on the more informative signal. The key implication is that managers with precise performance measures other than …rm performance will receive lower pay-…rm performance sensitivities. As we discussed in greater detail in Section 2.1, we use job classi…cations as a proxy for di¤ering precision of performance measures. The relevant distinction across job classi…cations is that some executives have explicit divisional responsibilities and therefore precise individual performance measures. Other executives have broad oversight authority and less precise individual performance measures. The average pay-…rm performance sensitivity should be lower for executives with divisional responsibility than for executives with oversight authority.
In this section, we test the prediction that the sensitivity of compensation to overall …rm performance will be lower for groups of executives for whom more precise individual signals of e¤ort are available. We examine the pay-performance incentives for executives grouped by job classi…cation. In this analysis, we regress the calculated pay-performance sensitivities for stock and option holdings on indicator variables for job classi…cation groups. We begin with median, ordinary least squares, robust, and …rm …xed e¤ects regressions. These regressions formalize the results in Table 2 while controlling for the e¤ects of the level of compensation, …rm size (the log of sales), and sample year. We then estimate regressions with executive …xed e¤ects to further control for the e¤ects of executive-speci…c characteristics. We also estimate the executive …xed e¤ects regression with additional control variables for payout policy (the dividend yield) and capital structure (the ratio of debt to assets). These variables are related to the …rm's contracting environment, as suggested by Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) .
Initial Regression Results
The econometric speci…cation for Table 3 is:
The dependent variable is the pay-…rm performance sensitivity (® it ) from holdings of stock and options of executive i in year t. The …rst two explanatory variables control for the e¤ect of both …rm risk and …rm size on incentives. Following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , we measure …rm risk as the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the variance of dollar returns for all executives at …rm j in year t, denoted by
¢ . The use of the CDF allows the pay-performance incentives at di¤erent points in the distribution of …rm risk to be easily compared.
Schaefer (1998) and Baker and Hall (1998) discuss the relationship between pay-performance incentives and …rm size. Following Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) and Jin (2002), we control for a possible relationship between …rm size and managerial incentives by including the log of sales for …rm j in year t, denoted by s j t .
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In addition, including the log of sales controls for the possibility that …rm size impacts the composition of our groups. For example, we are more likely to have divisional executives in our sample at larger …rms, and executives at larger …rms generally have lower incentives.
In this regression,°0 is the coe¢cient on the constant,°1 is the coe¢cient on the CDF of the variance, and°2 is the coe¢cient on the log of sales. Divisional executives are the omitted groupthe …rst three terms in the regression,°0 +°1F ¡ ¾ 2 j t ¢ +°2s j t ; give the pay-performance incentives of this group. The next three triplets of terms are the di¤erential pay-performance incentives of the other three groups relative to the Divisional group. CEO it is an indicator variable for whether the executive is CEO, OV S it is an indicator variable for whether the executive is in the Oversight group, and N EI it is an indicator variable for whether the executive is in the Neither group. The principal-agent model predicts that°1;°1 +°3;°1 +°5; and°1 +°7 will be negative.
For any group of executives, those at …rms with higher variances have lower pay-performance incentives than those at …rms with lower variances. We interact the log of sales with all of the group indicators so that the e¤ect of …rm size is di¤erentially estimated for all of the groups. By allowing the e¤ects of …rm size to di¤er by group, we can more precisely estimate the incentives for executive groups at a …rm of median size.
For example, an executive in the Oversight group at a …rm with the median stock return variance (F ¡ ¾ 2 j t ¢ = 0:5) and the median log of …rm sales (denoted by s) has pay-performance incentives of°0 + 0:5°1 + s°2 + (°6 + 0:5°7 + s°8). The pay-performance incentives of the same executive at a …rm with the minimum and maximum variances are calculated analogously by
, respectively. Our focus here is on di¤erences in incentives across job groups.
For example, the di¤erence in pay-performance incentives between the Oversight and Divisional
If …rm performance is less informative for Divisional executives than it is for Oversight executives, this di¤erence will be positive. In our empirical results below, we test for the signi…cance of this di¤erence for all groups at the median values of both variance and …rm size.
We also include control variables that are necessary for identi…cation of our model. Many theories predict that executives with di¤erent job responsibilities have di¤erent levels of compensation. One way to achieve di¤erent levels of compensation may be to give executives di¤erent pay-performance sensitivities. We wish to show that, after controlling for the level of compensation, there is a channel between an executive's responsibilities and her pay-performance sensitivity.
We include the logarithm of the executive's total compensation (ln w it ) as an independent variable. In order to prevent observations in which the wage is zero from being dropped from the sample, we add 0:01 to the wage variables before taking the logarithm. We also include separately the executive's short-term compensation (w S T it ) and long-term compensation (w LT it ), where
We further interact these three variables with dummy variables for the job groups. These twelve coe¢cients are represented by the vector,¯0x it , in equation (1). These compensation variables control for a possibly confounding relationship between compensation and incentives, as well as any di¤erences in that relationship across groups.
We also control for yearly di¤erences in average pay-performance sensitivities (such as the increase over time shown in Figures 1 and 2 ) by including year dummies ¹ t (interactions between the group dummies and the year dummies were jointly insigni…cant). In the fourth speci…cation in Table 3 , we also control for …rm level …xed e¤ects (± j ). Firm level …xed e¤ects control for any variation in an executive's pay-performance sensitivity that is related to a time-invariant characteristic of the executive's …rm j. In the …rst three speci…cations in Table 3 , ± j is set equal to zero for all …rms j.
Within …rms, there may be factors that a¤ect incentives that vary systematically by group.
For example, executives in the Oversight group might have higher average ability than Divisional executives. To the extent that these factors also in ‡uence the level of compensation (e.g., executives with higher ability receive higher compensation), including compensation in the regression proxies for the e¤ect of these factors on incentives. In the next subsection, we expand the …xed e¤ects to the executive level, rather than the …rm level, to more directly control for these factors as well.
Pay-performance sensitivities have traditionally been based on median stock ownership in a sample of executives (such as Jensen and Murphy's (1990) estimate for CEOs of $3:25 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth). As shown in Table 2 , the mean share ownership is substantially higher than the median, indicating the presence of outliers with very high ownership.
We therefore present estimates of the pay-performance sensitivities from equation (1) using median regression in the …rst column of Table 3.   5 For comparison, we present OLS estimates in the second column of Table 3 . As an alternative means of lessening the impact of outliers, we also present estimates from a robust regression (see Hamilton (1992) ) in the third column. In the fourth column, we present estimates from an OLS regression that includes …rm level …xed e¤ects.
In the median regression, Divisional executives at the …rm with median …rm variance
and median sales (s j t = 7) have pay-performance incentives of 0:836+0:5¤(¡0:320)+7¤(¡0:058) = 5 Median regression minimizes the sum of absolute deviations rather than the sum of squared deviations and is therefore less sensitive to outliers than is OLS. Further, since the median is a more robust measure of the center of the data than the mean, the precision of the estimates will also typically be higher in median regressions. See Koenker and Bassett (1982) and Buchinsky (1998) for discussions of median regression estimation. As shown in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , the dollar variance of …rm returns has a statistically and economically signi…cant negative e¤ect on pay-performance incentives. This is true for all four groups of executives.
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The bottom part of each column presents the results of the test that the pay-performance incentives are the same for each of the three groups (CEO, Oversight, and Neither) as for the Divisional group at the median variance and the median …rm sales. Oversight executives have pay-performance incentives that are $1:44 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than the pay-performance incentives of Divisional executives. CEOs have pay-performance incentives that are $9:81 per thousand higher, and executives in the Neither group have incentives that are $0:40 per thousand higher. These di¤erences in pay-performance incentives at the median variance are statistically signi…cant.
The twelve estimated coe¢cients on the compensation variables (not reported) are jointly signi…cant and show a generally positive relationship between pay-performance incentives and compensation. While higher pay-performance incentives are associated with higher levels of compensation, the factors that are proxied by the level of compensation only explain a portion of the di¤erences in median pay-performance incentives by job classi…cation. The di¤erences in pay-performance incentives across groups are estimated to be statistically signi…cant, even after controlling for di¤erences in compensation across the groups.
For the OLS regression, we …nd the same general pattern of coe¢cients as we …nd for the median regression. The bottom panel shows that the di¤erences in incentives for all three groups relative to the Divisional group are positive and signi…cant. Consistent with the disparity in mean and median incentives shown in Table 2 , the magnitudes of incentives are higher for the OLS regression than for the median regression. For the robust regression, all of the coe¢cients on the group, variance, and sales terms are of the same sign as in the median regression. The bottom panel shows 6 In our discussion of pay-performance sensitivities, we focus on comparisons between groups controlling for compensation levels and so refer to these group-speci…c terms as the "pay-performance incentives" for that group, e.g.,°0 +°1F
+°5CEO it s jt for CEOs. The actual pay-performance sensitivity also includes the e¤ects of the compensation, time, and …rm variables, i.e.,¯0x it + ¹ t + ± j . that the di¤erences in incentives for all three groups relative to the Divisional group are positive and signi…cant. The magnitudes of these di¤erences are lower than for the median regression.
Lastly, in the …rm …xed e¤ects regression, the tests for equality with the Divisional group show that Oversight executives and CEOs have signi…cantly higher pay-performance incentives than Divisional executives. The Neither group has insigni…cantly higher incentives than the Divisional group. Taken together, these four speci…cations show that there are signi…cant di¤erences in pay-performance incentives across groups of executives.
Executive Fixed E¤ect Results
The estimates in Table 3 in the previous subsection control for observable di¤erences in executives that are related to the level of compensation, the sample year, and, in the fourth column, …rm-speci…c characteristics. However, executives may have di¤erent pay-performance sensitivities based on individual-speci…c characteristics that are unobservable to the econometrician. For example, executives may have di¤erent levels of productivity, risk aversion, disutility of e¤ort, ability, and human capital as well as di¤er in age, experience, gender, and educational background.
If these factors vary systematically across the executives in the four job categories (e.g., executives with higher ability receive more incentives and are sorted into higher job categories), then the results in Table 3 might be in ‡uenced by these di¤erences in addition to di¤erences in the variances of the individual performance measures.
To control for such executive-speci…c characteristics, we augment equation (1) by including an executive …xed e¤ect (± i ) instead of the …rm …xed e¤ect (± j ). The interpretation of the coe¢cients in the executive …xed e¤ects regression is di¤erent from that of an OLS regression without …xed e¤ects. The coe¢cients in the executive …xed e¤ects speci…cation are identi…ed primarily by changes in the pay-performance incentives that executives receive when they switch groups, such as moving from Divisional to Oversight.
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In our sample, we observe 1; 977 transitions between groups made by 1; 766 executives. These executives are observed in 6; 602 executive-years, or about twenty percent of the observations. The …xed e¤ects coe¢cients re ‡ect the di¤erence in average incentives across groups over the sample period for this subset of executives. In our executive …xed e¤ects speci…cation, executives who do not switch groups contribute primarily to the identi…cation of the other variables in the regression, such as the compensation variables, the year e¤ects, and the variance and sales interactions. In addition, we augment the speci…cation to include other possible determinants of incentives. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) note that it is important to control for aspects of a …rm's contracting environment when estimating the determinants of incentives. We include payout policy (the dividend yield) and capital structure (the ratio of debt to assets).
The …rst column of Table 4 contains the results estimated using ordinary least squares with executive …xed e¤ects. Incentives are negatively and signi…cantly related to the variance of returns for all groups.
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In addition, incentives are negatively and signi…cantly related to the log of …rm sales for all groups. For the additional control variables, pay-performance incentives are lower for …rms with higher dividend yields. Capital structure does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on incentives.
The bottom panel of the table shows that the pay-performance incentives of the Oversight group are signi…cantly higher than those of the Divisional group. The pay-performance incentives of CEOs are signi…cantly higher than both. The incentives for the Neither group are also estimated to be higher than those of the Divisional group, but this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. 10 In the second column of Table 4 , we estimate robust regression on the …xed e¤ect residuals. As in Table 3 , the robust method yields smaller magnitudes of the coe¢cients compared to OLS but statistically signi…cant di¤erences in pay-performance incentives across the groups at the median variance and …rm size. In the robust speci…cation, the additional control variables are signi…cant. 9 The increments to the dollar return variance for the Oversight and Neither groups relative to the Divisional group are not signi…cant, but the aggregate e¤ects of the dollar return variance on the incentives of the Oversight and Neither groups are negative and signi…cant. 10 As shown in Table 1 , our Neither group is comprised of three types of executives. The …rst type, making up twenty percent of the group, includes executives who have responsibilities related to production, such as a vice-president in charge of manufacturing. These responsibilities are less speci…c than those of executives in our Divisional group, who all manage a designated subsidiary, division, or product line. However, it might be argued that the …rst subset of the Neither group is more similar to Divisional executives than it is to the rest of the Neither group (comprised of executives with corporate infrastructure responsibilities or unspeci…ed responsibilities).
To investigate this possibility, we estimate the …xed e¤ects speci…cation with this subset of executives reclassi…ed to the Divisional group. The di¤erences in pay-performance incentives between the (new) Divisional group and the other three groups are similar to those in the …rst column of Table 4 . Pay-performance incentives for the Oversight group are 0:126 higher than those for the Divisional group (compared to a 0:122 di¤erence in Table 4 ). Pay-performance incentives for the CEO group are 0:570 higher than those for the Divisional group (compared to a 0:566 di¤erence in Table 4 ). These di¤erences are statistically signi…cant. The di¤erence between the Divisional group and the Neither group continues to be insigni…cant. Thus, our main empirical results are robust to a reasonable change in the classi…cation scheme for executives.
The key di¤erence between the OLS results in Table 3 and the executive …xed e¤ect results in Table 4 concerns the size of the di¤erences in incentives across groups. At the median variance …rm, CEOs have pay-performance incentives that are $5:65 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than those of Divisional executives. This increase in incentives is 15 percent of the di¤erence of $36:59 per thousand reported in Table 3 for the OLS regression. Similarly, the di¤erence of $1:22 per thousand between the Oversight and Divisional groups in Table 4 is 26 percent of the $4:61 per thousand di¤erence reported in Table 3 . The di¤erences in estimated incentives across groups that remain after the executive …xed e¤ects have been included can be attributed to the presence of individual-speci…c signals of e¤ort that characterize the di¤erent groups, as predicted by the theory. Including the executive …xed e¤ects increases the R 2 for the regression to 97:1 percent. Clearly, much of the variation in pay-performance sensitivities in the sample is due to di¤erences in executive-speci…c characteristics. Table 3 .
As an additional robustness check, in the third and fourth columns of Table 4 , we estimate the executive …xed e¤ects speci…cation separately for holdings of Stock Only and Options Only.
Holdings of stock are to some extent voluntary and may be the result of idiosyncratic factors rather than optimal contracting. This conjecture is borne out in the results, as the R 2 including …xed e¤ects is higher for Stock Only than for Options Only, indicating that executive-speci…c factors explain more of the variation in stock holding across executives. In contrast, the R 2 excluding …xed e¤ects is higher for the Options Only than for Stock Only, indicating that the economic control variables (variance, sales, and compensation) explain more of the residual variation in incentives from options.
Examining each component of total incentives in isolation can be misleading in a …xed e¤ects speci…cation in which the coe¢cients are identi…ed based on within-executive changes in stock and option holdings. Executives often retain the stock in their company after exercising options, and compensation committees also make new stock option grants with some regard to executive's holdings of stock. As a result, year-to-year changes in either component in isolation provide a very noisy estimate of the change in total incentives. The salient feature of the two columns is that they partition the result for Stock and Options combined in the …rst column into components for stock and options individually. Note that for each variable, the sum of the coe¢cients in the two columns equals the coe¢cient in the …rst column.
Focusing on the bottom panel, for Stock Only, the group di¤erences relative to Divisional executives are signi…cant only for CEOs. For Options Only, the group di¤erences are positive and signi…cant for all groups. Options account for 64 (= 0:078=0:122) percent of the di¤erence in total pay-performance incentives between the Oversight and Divisional groups. Options account for 38 (= 0:212=0:565) percent and 93 (= 0:041=0:044) percent of the di¤erence in total pay-performance incentives for CEOs and Neither relative to Divisional, respectively. This decomposition shows that the key comparisons are due primarily to di¤erences in the incentives from options. This is consistent with the greater ease with which option incentives can be adjusted as part of an optimal compensation policy.
There are several potential alternative explanations for the di¤erences we observe in payperformance incentives across job groups. First, it may simply be the case that some positions are more important than others. For example, oversight positions might be more productive than divisional positions. In this case, an executive's productivity changes when she switches groups, and this change is not absorbed by executive …xed e¤ects. Executives in more productive positions will optimally be given higher pay-performance incentives to induce more e¤ort. Because they have greater incentives, they also have greater exposure to risk. As a result of both greater e¤ort and greater exposure to risk, the optimal contract gives more productive executives higher total ‡ow compensation. This is borne out in Table 2 , which shows that CEOs have more incentives and ‡ow compensation than do executives with oversight authority, who in turn have more incentives and ‡ow compensation than do executives with divisional responsibility. We include compensation variables in all of our explicit pay-performance sensitivity regressions (Tables 3 and 4) as a proxy for the productivity of the executive in the job. Executive …xed e¤ects remove executive-speci…c di¤erences in productivity. To the extent that there are still productivity di¤erences left due to job or position, they will be correlated with the level of compensation. Even after controlling for executive …xed e¤ects and the level of compensation, we …nd that there are statistically signi…cant di¤erences in pay-performance incentives across job classi…cations. These di¤erences are unlikely to be related to di¤erences in the average productivity of the executives across groups.
Second, career concerns may explain di¤erences in pay-performance incentives across job groups. Holmstrom (1999) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) note that career concerns can provide incentives to managers when they are young. As they near the end of their productive lives, stronger explicit incentives must be given to them to induce greater e¤ort provision. If CEOs are on average older than managers with oversight authority, who are, in turn, on average older than those with divisional responsibilities, then the di¤erences in pay-performance sensitivities that we observe might be the result of di¤erent career concerns across groups. Our executive …xed e¤ect speci…cation is robust to factors that increase linearly over time for all executives, such as age and experience, because it also includes year dummies. As a result, we have controlled for career concerns and still …nd an independent e¤ect due to di¤erences in managerial responsibility.
A third alternative explanation for the di¤erences in pay-performance sensitivities across groups of executives is that they re ‡ect tax-minimizing behavior on the part of …rms. The Internal Revenue Code requires annual compensation in excess of one million dollars to be related to performance if it is to be tax deductible at the corporate level. Under the tax-motivated hypothesis, di¤erences in pay-performance sensitivities across groups might be a consequence of …rms trying to pay these executives di¤erent average levels of compensation. There are two reasons why tax considerations are unlikely to be generating our results. First, Table 2 shows that CEOs are the only group with median ‡ow compensation in excess of one million dollars. The other three groups have median ‡ow compensation substantially less than one million dollars. Rose and Wolfram (2002) …nd no evidence that the tax-deductibility cap on executive compensation has had any impact on executives' pay-performance sensitivities. Second, we also control for the level of compensation directly in all of our pay-performance sensitivity regressions for stock and options, allowing the relationship between compensation and incentives to di¤er across the groups. Comparisons of the pay-performance sensitivities across groups, especially the main comparison between the Oversight and Divisional groups, are therefore unlikely to be distorted by tax minimizing concerns.
Pay-Performance Sensitivities of the Top Management Team
Our data also allow us to calculate pay-performance sensitivities for the top management team.
We de…ne the top management team to be the top …ve executives at a …rm. This de…nition of the team is somewhat restrictive, but it is consistent with the SEC reporting requirements and the ExecuComp sample design. As we have demonstrated, the pay-performance sensitivity varies by job classi…cation. For each …rm in each sample year, we calculate the team pay-performance sensitivity as the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO plus four times the average pay-performance sensitivity of all other executives at the …rm for whom pay-performance sensitivities are reported.
Group-speci…c and aggregate pay-performance sensitivities for the top management team are reported in Table 5 . The …rst two rows report the mean and median pay-performance sensitivities from stock and options (as in Table 2 ), along with our estimate of the team pay-performance sensitivity. For the top management team, the mean pay-performance sensitivity is $69:42 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth and the median pay-performance sensitivity is $30:80 per thousand.
The next two rows report the estimated pay-performance sensitivities from ‡ow compensation.
Because ‡ow compensation does not require direct ownership of the …rm, the pay-performance sensitivity must be estimated according to the "implicit" method discussed in Murphy (1999) . The implicit pay-performance sensitivity is simply the coe¢cient on …rm performance in a regression with the level of compensation as the dependent variable. Determinants of the implicit payperformance sensitivity can be analyzed by interacting variables, such as the variance of the …rm's stock return or indicator variables for job group, with the …rm performance variable.
The table presents the pay-performance sensitivities at the median variance for each of the groups using median regression and ordinary least squares controlling for executive …xed e¤ects.
The pay-performance sensitivities are positive and signi…cant for all groups in both regressions.
The table also reports the test of equality between the pay-performance sensitivities of Divisional executives and all other groups calculated at the median variance.
Focusing on the median regressions, the pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs is $0:70 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth, signi…cantly higher than the pay-performance sensitivities for the other groups. The pay-performance sensitivity of the Oversight executives is $0:29 per thousand and is signi…cantly larger than the $0:17 per thousand for Divisional executives.
The pay-performance sensitivity for the Neither group is $0:15 per thousand and is insigni…cantly di¤erent from the Divisional group. The results for ‡ow compensation are consistent with our results from holdings of stock and options, as executives with more precise signals of their e¤ort relative to the overall performance of the …rm have lower pay-performance sensitivities than do executives with less precise individual-speci…c signals. For ‡ow compensation, we assume that the team is comprised of a CEO and four other executives drawn at random from the other three groups. The pay-performance sensitivity from ‡ow compensation for the team is $1:52 per thousand using median regression and $1:60 per thousand using …xed e¤ect regressions. Adding the …gures for ‡ow compensation to those for stock and options give total incentives of $32:32 and $71:02 per thousand at the median and mean, respectively.
Past work on compensation has largely focused on the incentives provided to the CEO. As one example, the debate over whether incentives facing top management are large or small that began with Jensen and Murphy (1990) and has been recently discussed by Hall and Liebman (1998) pertains only to CEOs (a notable exception is Schaefer (1998) , who examines teams of the four best-paid executives by …rm in ExecuComp and relates the team's compensation to …rm size).
Our estimates show that CEOs receive only 42 to 58 percent of the incentives provided to the top management team, even when the team is limited to the next four highest paid executives. In addition, these calculations show that the aggregate incentives provided to the top management team are quite substantial. Combining stock, options, and ‡ow compensation, the mean top management team receives about seven percent of the dollar returns to shareholders. The median top management team receives more than three percent of the dollar returns to shareholders. Most of these incentives come in the form of holdings of stock and stock options-the pay-performance sensitivity from stock and options is twenty times that from ‡ow compensation.
Results for Divisional Performance Measures
In order to further understand the role of managerial responsibilities in determining the payperformance sensitivities, we next consider more direct evidence on the way that divisional performance a¤ects the compensation of divisional executives. To do so, we match divisional executives in ExecuComp to the segments of their companies for which they have management responsibility.
Firms are required to report disaggregated accounting information on their proxy statements for any segment comprising 10 percent of the …rm's sales. For these purposes, segments are de…ned to be components of an enterprise that provide a group of related products or services primarily to customers for a pro…t. Segments may be de…ned with respect to a line of business, a geographic region, or set of operations. We use the segment data from the Compustat Industry Segment database.
Executive-Segment Matches
We …rst construct all pairwise combinations of our 6,397 divisional executives in ExecuComp and their companies' segments. This generates 26,371 potential matches. For each potential match, we compare the job title in ExecuComp (based on the company's DEF 14A …ling) with the segment name in the Industry Segment database (based on the company's 10-K …ling). Each author compared the names separately, and then discrepancies were resolved. For each executive whose title did not correspond exactly to any of the …rm's segments, we searched the company's 10-K (via the EDGAR system at www.sec.gov), the company's web site, and Lexis-Nexis for further information to identify the segment for which the executive is responsible. This procedure yields 3,278 matches, of which 2,504 or 76 percent are business segments and 774 are geographic segments.
1 2 A single executive might match with one or more business segments as well as one or more geographic segments. Our 3,278 executive-segment matches correspond to 2,937 unique divisional executives. We are therefore able to match 46 percent of our sample of 6,397 divisional executives.
There are three principal reasons why we are unable to match the remaining 54 percent of the divisional executives. First, we are not able to locate segment information for some companies in the Industry Segment database. Second, the job title, 10-K, company web site, and LexisNexis search are too vague to match some executives with a segment, although speci…c enough to classify the executive in the divisional group (e.g., "ceo-sub."). Third, some segments for which executives are responsible are too small to meet the reporting requirement.
We focus on two empirical relationships. The …rst is whether divisional executives receive more compensation when their segments perform better and whether this sensitivity depends on the volatility of divisional performance. In other words, is the pay-divisional performance sensitivity positive and does it decrease in the variance of the divisional performance measure? The second is whether the pay-…rm performance sensitivity is higher when the divisional performance measure is more volatile. In order to estimate these relationships, we require both a measure of divisional performance and its volatility. We use data on divisional sales to proxy for divisional performance. 13 Divisional performance in a given sample year is the change in the log of sales from the previous year, and the volatility of divisional performance is the variance of the change in log of sales over the 1991-1999 period. This period includes our sample period, plus two years on both sides, to allow more precise calculations of variance. To distinguish divisional sales from sales at the …rm as a whole, we also include the change in the log of …rm-level sales as an additional performance measure in our analyses, with performance and volatility constructed analogously to divisional sales.
Pay-Divisional Performance Sensitivities
In this subsection, we focus on short-term compensation. We do this because stock and option holdings are explicitly related to the stock market performance of the …rm as a whole. As a result, the primary way for …rms to reward executives for good divisional performance is through the annual bonus and changes in salary. We estimate an implicit pay-performance sensitivity by regressing the log of short-term compensation, de…ned as salary plus bonus, on our three measures of performance: the total return to shareholders, expressed in percentage points; the change in log divisional sales; and the change in log …rm sales. A positive pay-divisional performance sensitivity is consistent with our argument that the lower pay-…rm performance sensitivity estimated above for divisional executives is due to the use of divisional performance as an additional signal of managerial e¤ort.
We consider the relationship between divisional performance and incentives not just for divisional executives paired with their own segments, but for every possible combination of segments and executives at the same …rm in a given year. There are nine such combinations. The …rst is divisional executives paired with their own segments. At …rms where a divisional executive pairs with a segment, there are other executives in our sample in each of the Neither, Divisional, Oversight and CEO groups. The second through …fth combinations pair matched segments with other executives classi…ed as Neither, Divisional, Oversight, and CEO at the same …rms in the same years. We also have data on segments at …rms in which no divisional executive pairs with the segment. Our sixth through ninth combinations pair segments that were not matched to a divisional executive in ExecuComp with all executives classi…ed as Neither, Divisional, Oversight, and CEO at the same …rms in the same years. This set of nine combinations is exhaustive-it includes all categories of executives and both matched and unmatched segments. The nine combinations allow us to consider two potential sources of endogeneity. First, divisional executives managing a segment may not be the only executives for whom that segment's performance is relevant in determining optimal incentives. Second, segments that are matched to a divisional executive who is among the top …ve at a …rm may be di¤erent than segments that are not matched to such an executive. We estimate separate pay-performance sensitivities for these nine groups.
For an executive i working at …rm j in year t, whom we have classi…ed into one of the nine groups (indexed by the superscript, k), the speci…cation we estimate is:
The variable z k it is an indicator variable for whether executive i is in group k in year t. w S T it is shortterm compensation. We include three performance measures. We denote total percentage return to shareholders at …rm j by r j t (with variance ¾ 2 r jt ), the change in the logarithm of divisional sales for executive i's division as d it (with variance ¾ 2 di ), and the change in the logarithm of total sales at …rm j by f j t (with variance ¾ 2 f j ). We interact the performance measures with the CDFs of their variances, indicated by the function F (¢). Note that because the explanatory variable in this regression is the percentage return to shareholders, we interact it with the variance of percentage returns. This variance is calculated using monthly percentage returns over the preceding …ve years. For the changes in log divisional and …rm sales, variances are calculated using annual changes over as much of the 1991 -1999 period for which the segment reports data.
The regression also includes the three CDFs interacted with the nine group variables to control for a possibly confounding relationship between the level of compensation and variance. These variables are represented by the vector,¯0x it , in equation (2). The equation also includes groupspeci…c year e¤ects, ¹ k t . The pay-divisional performance sensitivity at the median variance, where
5, is given by°k 3 + 0:5°k 4 . Similarly, the performance sensitivities with respect to total return to shareholders and the log of …rm sales are given by°k 1 + 0:5°k 2 and°k 5 + 0:5°k 6 , respectively, at the median variance.
1 4 Table 6 reports the median regression estimates of equation (2). The rows of the table distinguish the nine groups of executive-segment pairings, starting with divisional executives paired with the segments that they manage. The …rst column identi…es the group and the number of observations. In total, there are 101; 522 executive-segment-year observations from 10; 646 unique executives, 34; 383 unique executive-segment pairings, and 27; 726 unique executive-years.
The next four columns pertain to the total return to shareholders, the middle four columns pertain to the divisional performance measure, and the last four columns pertain to the …rm sales measure. Within each panel of the table, the …rst two columns show the coe¢cients on performance and performance interacted with the CDF of variance. The third column combines these two coe¢cients to obtain the pay-performance sensitivity at the median variance, and the fourth column reports the p-value for the test of equality between the pay-performance sensitivity for the speci…ed group and the divisional executives managing their own segments (the …rst row).
For divisional executives paired with their own segments, we …nd that pay-performance sensitivities are positive and signi…cant for both the total return to shareholders and the percentage change in divisional sales. A key feature of the results is that these pay-performance sensitivities decline with the volatility of the performance measure. A one percentage point increase in total return to shareholders increases short-term compensation by 0:31 percent at the median variance.
Similarly, a one percent increase in divisional sales growth increases short-term compensation by 0:28 percent at the median variance. For …rm sales, the pay-performance sensitivity is negative and signi…cant (at the 6 percent level), though the decline with volatility is not statistically signi…cant. A one percent increase in …rm sales growth decreases short-term compensation by 14 The unit of observation in equation (2) is an executive-segment-year. A given divisional executive in a given year can appear in up to three of the nine di¤erent groups (and multiple times within each group). For example, if the …rm reports three segments that year, the executive can be managing the …rst; a colleague in the sample could be managing the second; and a colleague not in the sample could be managing the third. (Non-divisional executives can show up in the latter two groups only). Thus, the error term in the regression, " k it , is group-speci…c, but the error terms for the same executive in a given year cannot be assumed to be independent across the several segments. We account for the e¤ect of this dependence on our standard errors by sampling all observations from a given executive-year, rather than individual executive-segment-years, in our bootstrap procedure. 0:26 percent at the median variance. The negative pay-performance sensitivity to …rm sales growth is consistent with relative performance evaluation of divisional managers-their short-term compensation increases with divisional performance only to the extent that the growth exceeds the growth in …rm-level sales. For divisional executives matched to the segments they run, the extent to which they are compensated on a performance measure depends on the precision of that measure.
The next four rows of the table show the coe¢cients and pay-performance sensitivities for pairings of other executives with these matched segments. All four groups have positive and statistically signi…cant pay-performance sensitivities with respect to the total return to shareholders at the median variance. The point estimates of the pay-…rm performance sensitivities are smaller for the Neither and Divisional groups and larger for the Oversight and CEO groups, but these di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant. For divisional sales growth, the point estimates for the pay-performance sensitivities at the median variance are positive for all groups, though signi…cant only for the Neither and Oversight groups and (marginally) for the CEO group. In addition, the variance of divisional performance is signi…cant only for the Neither group. Although none of the di¤erences in the pay-divisional performance sensitivities relative to divisional executives paired with their own segments are statistically signi…cant, the results suggest that the matched segment's performance is less important for other Divisonal executives-who have a different individual-speci…c signal-as well as the Oversight and CEO groups, for whom total return to shareholders is more indicative of the full range of their e¤orts. For …rm sales growth, the pay-performance sensitivities at the median variance are statistically signi…cant only for CEOs.
The last four rows of the table show the coe¢cients and pay-performance sensitivities for pairings of executives with segments that were not matched to a divisional executive in ExecuComp.
The pay-…rm performance sensitivities at the median variance for total return to shareholders are positive and signi…cant for all groups. The magnitudes are larger than for divisional executives managing their own segments, and this di¤erence is signi…cant for CEOs. For divisional sales growth, only the pay-divisional performance sensitivity for the Divisional group is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, but this sensitivity is negative, suggesting the possibility of relative performance evaluation across divisional managers. All are estimated to be signi…cantly lower than observed for the divisional executives matched to their own segments. For …rm sales growth, the point estimates of the pay-performance sensitivities are less negative than in the groups paired with matched segments. When there is less positive weight placed on a segment's sales growth, there is more positive weight placed on the …rm's sales growth.
The results in Table 6 lead to three conclusions, First, segment performance has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the short-term compensation of divisional executives who have management responsibility for those segments. Second, this pay-divisional performance sensitivity is decreasing in the variance of divisional performance, consistent with the view that divisional performance provides an alternative, informative performance measure for divisional executives. Third, in general, for the other groups of executives, the pay-divisional performance sensitivity is smaller than for divisional executives matched to segments, though these di¤erences are not signi…cant in comparisons to other executives paired with the matched segments. The magnitudes of the di¤erences suggest that divisional performance is a less informative measure for managers of other divisions, as well as for the Oversight and CEO groups. One caveat to note is that there are large di¤erences between the segment pay-performance sensitivities for all groups estimated for matched versus unmatched segments. Consequently, some of the signi…cance of the positive result for the divisional executives with management responsibilities for matched segments may be due to the importance of the matched segments at the …rm. Matched segments are important enough to the …rm as a whole to be managed by an executive who is among the top …ve highly compensated executives at the …rm.
Incentives from Stock and Options, Revisited
We now reconsider the incentives provided from holdings of stock and options. Having established that …rms use divisional performance measures to determine the short-term compensation of their executives, we determine whether these alternative performance measures allow the …rm to provide weaker incentives on the performance of the …rm as a whole through stock and options. We augment equation (1) from section 3.1 to include the CDFs of the variances of the two additional performance measures, divisional (segment) sales and …rm sales, as well as the additional executive groups. Because we have added the CDF of the variance of …rm sales, we omit the log of …rm sales from this speci…cation. The new speci…cation is:
As in equation (1), the dependent variable is the pay-…rm performance sensitivity (® it ) from holdings of stock and options of executive i in year t. Also as in equation (1),°k 1 is predicted to be negative. Because d i and f j re ‡ect alternative performance measures,°k 2 and°k 3 are predicted to be positive for executives for whom these measures are an important determinant of incentives.
They are predicted to be positive because, as the volatility of the alternative performance measures increases (i.e., the alternative performance measures become less informative), …rms will rely more heavily on total return to shareholders in the optimal contract.
Median regression estimates of equation (3) are presented in Table 7 . The rows indicate each of the nine groups of executive-segment matches. The di¤erences in the results for matched and unmatched segments are also consistent with the results in Table 6 , which showed that matched segments have a greater impact on the payperformance incentives in short-term compensation. They indicate a contracting environment in which there is a more reliable alternative performance measure than when the segment is not matched. For an executive with a more reliable alternative (i.e., matched), total pay-performance incentives are lower (column 1) and decline less rapidly with increased dollar return volatility (column 2). When the alternative measure is more reliable for an executive (i.e., matched), increases in the alternative measure's volatility lead to greater reliance on stock and options to provide incentives (column 3). Finally, when the alternative measure is reliable for an executive, …rms do not provide strong incentives based on the change in …rm sales, and changes in …rm sales growth volatility do not a¤ect the use of stock and options to provide incentives (column 4). When the alternative measure is not reliable for an executive (i.e., unmatched), …rms provide stronger incentives based on the change in …rm sales, and Table 7 shows that the volatility of …rm sales growth does a¤ect the use of stock and options to provide incentives. As in Table 6 , the results clearly show an e¤ect of segment performance measures on the incentives provided to the divisional executives who have management responsibility for those segments.
Conclusion
We study the design of incentives for managers with di¤erent responsibilities within the …rm.
Shareholders' inferences about a manager's e¤ort will depend on the precision of signals of various performance measures. We exploit the di¤erences in managerial responsibilities to examine the e¤ect of multiple performance measures on managerial incentives. We show that the sensitivity of compensation to …rm performance is lower for groups of managers with precise individual-speci…c signals about their e¤ort.
We classify managers into four groups: CEOs, other executives with oversight authority for the entire …rm, executives with divisional responsibility, and executives with neither oversight authority nor divisional responsibility. We argue that executives with divisional responsibility have more precise individual-speci…c measures of performance compared to executives with oversight authority or CEOs. As a result, executives with divisional responsibility should have lower payperformance sensitivities. We document that CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities than do executives with oversight authority, who in turn have higher pay-performance sensitivities than those with divisional responsibility.
We recognize that there are many potential explanations for di¤erences in pay-performance incentives across job groups. We control for these possibilities by including executive …xed e¤ects, year e¤ects, the level of compensation, and variables related to the …rm's contracting environment in our empirical work. After controlling for these factors, we …nd that executives with oversight authority have incentives that are $1:22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than those of executives with divisional responsibility. CEOs have incentives that are $5:65 per thousand higher than those of executives with divisional responsibility. These di¤erences are substantial and demonstrate that the pay-…rm performance sensitivity is lower for executives for whom a more precise individual signal of e¤ort is available. We also show that the aggregate incentives of the top management team are quite substantial.
As a …nal test, we examine how incentives are in ‡uenced by the presence of divisional performance measures. We …nd that the pay-…rm performance sensitivity for executives with divisional responsibility is decreasing in the precision of the divisional performance measure. For short-term compensation, we …nd that the pay-divisional performance sensitivity is positive and increasing in the precision of the divisional performance measure for divisional executives.
These results have implications for the theory of the …rm and the internal economics of organizations. Our results support the principal-agent model's prediction that compensation is structured to balance risk-sharing against incentives. More importantly, the degree of risk-sharing inherent in the pay-performance sensitivity varies according to the manager's responsibilities. Our results suggest an important role for performance-related incentives in the compensation of top managers other than the CEO of a …rm. The principal-agent problem should be thought of as pertaining to the top management team rather than just to a CEO. Table 1 Summary Information on Job Categories based on Reported Titles Our classification scheme for executives is as follows. The CEO group is comprised of executives who are designated by ExecuComp to be the CEO of the firm in a given year. CEO status is determined by ExecuComp to be the individual who held the title for the longest time during the year. The Oversight group is comprised of all other executives who carry the titles of president, chairman, vice-chairman, chief financial officer (CFO), and chief operating officer (COO). In the Oversight group, "Other Chief Executives" are executives who carry the title of CEO but are not designated by ExecuComp as the CEO of the firm in that year. These executives are typically CEOs who were replaced early in the year or new CEOs hired or promoted late in the year. The sum of the percentages for the categories within the Oversight group exceeds 100 due to the instances in which executives carry more than one title, e.g., President and COO. The Divisional group is comprised of all executives without oversight authority who are listed as a top executive of a division with the firm. The Neither group is comprised of all remaining executives for whom a job title is reported-those with neither explicit divisional responsibility nor primary oversight authority. The omitted category of executives is the Divis ional group. Coefficients on other groups pertain to differences between those groups and the Divisional group. Coefficients for the year effects (µ t ), the interactions between the three compensation variables and the four group variables, and the interactions between the dummy variable for missing data on sales and the four group variables are not reported. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient (based on 200 replications for the median regression using the bootstrap procedure in Gould (1992) ). Fixed effects at the firm level (δ j ) are included only in the fourth column. The bottom panel reports test statistics that are the difference in the pay-performance sensitivity between the specified group and the Divisional group at a firm with median variance and median sales. The p-value in brackets is for the null hypothesis that the difference is zero. The sample size is 13,109 executives in 33,607 executive-years, representing 1,778 firms. There are 42 observations with missing data on sales. The omitted category of executives is the Divisional group. Coefficients on other groups pertain to differences between those groups and the Divisional group. Coefficients for the year effects (µ t ), the interactions between the three compensation variables and the four group variables, and the interactions between the dummy variable for missing data on sales and the four group variables are not reported. The robust regression in the second column is estimated using the deviations from within-executive means of all variables. The standard errors are adjusted to account for the degrees of freedom used to estimate the within-executive means. For all other columns, fixed effects at the executive le vel (δ i ) are included and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient. The bottom panel reports test statistics that are the difference in the pay-performance sensitivity between the specified group and the Divisional group at a firm with median variance and median sales. The p-value in brackets is for the null hypothesis that the difference is zero. The sample size is 13,109 executives in 33,607 executive-years, representing 1,778 firms. There are 42 observations with missing data on sales and 1,954 observations with missing data on debt/assets. All estimates are in dollars of compensation per thousand-dollar increase in shareholder wealth. For stock and options, the pay-performance sensitivity for each group is reported in Table 2 . For each firm in each sample year, we calculate the team pay-performance sensitivity as the payperformance sensitivity of the CEO plus four times the average pay-performance sensitivity of all other executives at the firm for whom pay-performance sensitivities are reported. The table reports the mean and median team pay-performance sensitivities across all firms. For flow compensation, the pay-performance sensitivity for each group is reported for executives at a firm with the median variance. The pay-performance sensitivity for the top management team is the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO group plus four times the sample weighted average payperformance sensitivity of the other three groups. The number of observations in each group is given in Table 1 for the stock and option estimates. Due to missing data on total return to shareholders, the number of observations in each group in the regressions for flow compensation are: CEO = 6,793, Oversight = 8,940, Divisional = 6,391, and Neither = 11,432. Coefficients for the interactions between the nine groups and the constant, year effects, and CDFs of the variances of each of the three performance measures are not reported. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient based on 200 bootstrap replications using the procedure in Gould (1992) , controlling for dependence among executive-segment-year observations derived from the same executive-year. The p-value in the fourth column of each panel is for the null hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity at the median variance is equal to the pay-performance sensitivity of divisional executives paired with the segments they manage (the first row). The sample size is 101,522 executive-segment-years, comprised of 10,646 unique executives, 34,383 unique executive-segment pairings, and 27,726 unique executive-years. The pseudo R-squared of the regression is 0.1859. Coefficients for the year effects and the interactions between the nine groups and the three compensation variables are not reported. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient based on 200 bootstrap replications using the procedure in Gould (1992) , controlling for dependence among executive-segment-year observations derived from the same executive-year. The sample size is 107,454 executive-segment-years, comprised of 10,692 unique executives, 35,963 unique executive-segment pairings, and 27,856 unique executive-years. The pseudo R-squared of the regression is 0.1160. 
